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Reducing the Discount Rate
Combining the effects of health care inflation and wealth-adjusted 
 willingness to pay for future benefits, the undervaluation of lives saved  
decades from now via current cost-benefit analysis becomes especially stark
man lives cannot be justified even on the discounters’ 
own economic terms. 
Our first argument is that because CBA has thus 
far ignored evidence of rising health care expendi-
tures, it underestimates the “willingness to pay” for 
health and safety that future citizens will likely ex-
hibit, thereby undervaluing their lives. Our second 
argument is that until recently CBA has ignored the 
trend of improved material conditions in developed 
countries, and most agencies continue to ignore it 
entirely. As time advances, residents of rich countries 
tend to live better and spend more, meaning that a 
strict economic evaluation of future lives would dis-
count the relatively impoverished lives of present 
citizens compared to the projected luxurious and 
healthy existence of our expected descendents, just 
the opposite of what happens in agency practice.
Because all federal regulatory agencies calculate 
costs and benefits, the underregulation resulting 
from improper discounting deprives Americans of 
benefits in several diverse ways. By undercounting 
the benefits of environmental protection, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency deprives Americans of 
clean air and clean water. By undercounting the ben-
efits of workplace safety, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration exposes Americans to health 
hazards. By undercounting the benefits of automo-
bile accident prevention, the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration increases the number of 
fatal crashes. Examples are limited only by the num-
ber of federal agencies and the scope of their regula-
U
nderregulation kills. When a sensible 
and effective rule is proposed but then 
not implemented, society loses what-
ever benefits the regulation would have 
provided. When those benefits take the 
form of saved lives — if, for example, the rule would 
have kept a carcinogen out of the workplace — fail-
ing to enact and enforce a regulation means people 
die. Unfortunately, federal agencies in the United 
States systematically undercount the benefits of rule-
making, causing regulators to forsake the implemen-
tation of lifesaving measures that would have been 
enacted were benefits estimated more accurately. The 
result is American lives lost, every year.
This article presents two arguments against the 
“discounting” of future human lives as part of cost-
benefit analysis, or CBA. Discounting works like 
compound interest in reverse to reduce benefits 
achieved in the future to their present value, where 
they can be compared to present costs, since (it is as-
sumed) future benefits are worth less today. Naturally 
the discount rate (percentage interest rate) employed 
affects this outcome, but the point is that the rates 
used by agencies today systematically undercount 
benefits. Absent ethical objections to the disparate 
treatment of present and future humanity, the eco-
nomic calculations of CBA itself — if properly per-
formed — counsel against discounting lives. In other 
words, even if society sets aside all moral concerns 
with the discounting of future generations in prin-
ciple, the current practice of discounting future hu-
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tory mandate. Regulations concerning global climate 
change, the benefits of which would be realized far 
into the future, are especially impeded by overdis-
counting. Until regulators correct their method for 
discounting the benefits of saving human lives in the 
future, the United States will continue to suffer the 
fatal costs of underregulation, and agencies will re-
main in violation of legal requirements to maximize 
net benefits.
W
hen deciding whether and how to 
regulate, federal agencies evaluate 
the costs and benefits of proposed 
regulatory strategies, comparing one 
strategy against another and against 
doing nothing. Because the purpose of regulation is 
often to save lives — or at least to reduce risks to life 
— the benefits of many potential policies cannot be 
quantified without setting a value on human life. (Al-
though non-fatal harms are also prevented through 
regulation of environmental and workplace hazards, 
agencies often ignore these regulatory benefits dur-
ing CBA, in part because quantifying such benefits is 
complicated.) For example, imagine a potential De-
partment of Transportation regulation providing that 
any city receiving federal highway construction funds 
must employ a specified number of school crossing 
guards to prevent students from being struck by 
cars. The costs of the regulation could be estimated 
with some pretense of accuracy. How many crossing 
guards do recipient cities employ today? How much 
would each additional guard’s salary, fringe benefits, 
and overhead cost? Although some estimation will 
be necessary, a plausible number can be offered. 
For this exercise, assume extra crossing guards cost 
a total of $100 million yearly. The benefits of extra 
guards, however, defy straightforward quantification. 
Even if the sole benefit is the prevention of fatal car 
accidents, the magnitude of the benefit remains un-
knowable — or at least not capable of being weighed 
against the $100 million cost — unless the policy-
maker ascribes a monetary value to each life saved. 
If the extra guards would save 20 lives annually, then 
the value of the benefits exceeds the value of the costs 
only if each life saved is valued above $5 million.
How much is it worth to save a schoolchild from 
being killed by a speeding car? At some level, the 
question is preposterous, unanswerable. But laws and 
executive orders requiring that CBA be performed 
demand a number. To calculate the value of a human 
life—sometimes called the “value of a statistical life,” 
or VSL — economists have attempted to determine 
how persons value the elimination of risks of death. 
For example, if a person would pay x dollars to avoid 
a one-in-a-hundred chance of instant death, then the 
person values his own life at 100-times-x dollars. To 
determine a person’s “willingness to pay” to avoid a 
risk, one can simply ask (i.e., collect survey data), 
or one can extrapolate willingness to pay based on 
real-world phenomena, such as wage premiums for 
dangerous jobs. If two jobs are otherwise identical 
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but one presents a one-in-a-thousand risk of death 
each year for every worker, then employees at the 
dangerous job should demand higher compensation. 
An annual wage premium of $8,000 would imply 
that workers are willing to accept the risk in exchange 
for that amount (or that workers at the safe job are 
willing to pay $8,000 to avoid the risk), leading to a 
statistical life valued at $8 million.
With a VSL of $8 million, an agency dedicated 
to workplace safety could evaluate a proposed regu-
lation. (Recent subjects of federal analysis include 
“General Working Conditions in Shipyard Employ-
ment,” “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Re-
quirements,” and “Proximity Detection Systems for 
Continuous Mining Machines in Underground Coal 
Mines.”) Imagine that a new machine, if installed at 
an especially dangerous workplace, would reduce 
fatal accidents, saving five lives every year. Under a 
basic CBA, federal regulators would mandate instal-
lation of the machine if it costs less than $40 million 
(that is, five saved workers multiplied by the $8 mil-
lion VSL). A machine priced at $41 million would 
not be “cost beneficial,” and a competitor priced at 
$39 million would be. The same principles apply 
when agencies consider proposals about shipyard 
conditions, flightcrew schedules, and mining equip-
ment. At least, that is the basic idea.
The actual process, however, is more complicat-
ed. In addition to calculating the values of costs and 
benefits, regulators must consider when costs will be 
borne and when benefits will be enjoyed. A benefit 
reaped today is normally worth more than the same 
benefit tomorrow, and a cost incurred today normal-
ly hurts more than the prospect of an identical fu-
ture cost. Because many regulations impose up-front 
costs to achieve future benefits, a CBA incorporates 
the “present value” of future benefits.
C
ontroversy results from the combination 
of these two practices — the valuation of 
statistical lives and the discounting of fu-
ture benefits. The problem is that while a 
dollar available today is worth more than 
a dollar provided in the future, it is far less clear that 
a life saved today is more valuable than a life saved 
a few years from now. If one regulation can deliver 
x dollars immediately and another regulation cost-
ing the same amount would take 10 years to deliver 
the same dollar amount, then the first regulation 
wins any CBA contest. But if one regulation saves a 
schoolchild today, and another regulation costing the 
same amount would save a schoolchild 10 years from 
now, which regulation should be enacted? Right or 
wrong, the consensus among policymakers is that 
the life saved today is indeed worth more than the 
one saved in the future, and CBA practices gener-
ally discount future VSLs just as they discount future 
economic benefits.
To see the potential power of discounting, let 
us return to the $39 million machine. If we imag-
ine that the machine would save one life annually 
for five years — after which it would need replace-
ment — the CBA initially seems to favor requiring 
the device. The benefits are $40 million, saving five 
workers’ lives at $8 million each, which exceeds the 
cost by $1 million. But the entire cost of the machine 
is borne today, whereas the benefits (saved lives) will 
be realized only in the future. After the saved lives are 
discounted to present value, the machine is no lon-
ger cost-beneficial at $39 million. Future workers are 
worth less than current ones, and the further into the 
future lives are saved by a regulation, the less valuable 
those lives appear to agencies considering regulations 
today.
Explicit discounting of future saved lives appears 
in the regulatory impact analyses accompanying all 
sorts of rules proposed every year. To choose but one 
example, let us consider a 2010 rule concerning food 
labeling enacted by the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service of the Department of Agriculture. The rule 
requires labels disclosing the percentage of fat in cer-
tain meat products, including ground hamburger 
meat, where such labeling was previously voluntary. 
The rule is expected to cost meat producers and re-
tailers hundreds of millions of dollars. The project-
ed benefits would appear in the form of improved 
health enjoyed by meat consumers caused by greater 
access to nutritional information. The agency esti-
mated that after the labeling rules have been in force 
for several years, the regulation will save about 114.5 
lives annually. Accordingly, like so many regulations, 
the meat-labeling rule will have up-front costs and 
distant benefits, making the discount rate an impor-
tant part of the CBA. The higher the discount rate, 
the lower the present value of the benefits, and the 
less likely such a regulation will be enacted. 
The value of a statistical life chosen by the agency 
will also significantly affect the result, with a higher 
VSL leading to higher benefit numbers. Here, the 
agency calculated a range of expected benefits, using 
VSLs from $5 million to $6.5 million and discount 
rates of 3 percent and 7 percent (commonly used 
rates). The vastly different outcomes starkly illustrate 
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the importance of the discount rate and VSL chosen 
by the agency. With a VSL of $6.5 million and a dis-
count rate of 3 percent, the total benefits are estimat-
ed to equal $5.9 billion. With a VSL of $5 million 
and a discount rate of 7 percent, the total benefits 
are estimated to equal $1.1 billion. In other words, 
with no changes in assumptions concerning the ef-
fectiveness of food labeling in changing consumption 
habits, the relationship between meat consumption 
and fatal diseases, or the likelihood that industry 
will obey new regulations, the estimated benefits can 
nonetheless increase more than five-fold (or, from the 
other perspective, decrease by more than 80 percent) 
depending on procedural choices made by an agency 
during the CBA process.
This regulatory impact analysis also illustrates an-
other reason that discounting of human lives plays 
such an important role when regulations are under 
review. Even though the agency believed that its pro-
posed meat-labeling rule would have benefits in addi-
tion to saving human lives, those benefits were ignored 
when the agency quantified the rule’s estimated mon-
etary benefits. As a result, for purposes of the CBA, 
the value of preventing a nonfatal cancer was zero. 
Similarly, in the regulatory impact analysis justifying a 
recent OSHA regulation aimed at preventing crane ac-
cidents, “the agency did not estimate cost savings from 
avoiding crane accidents, but only estimated mon-
etized benefits for avoiding fatalities . . . or injuries.” 
The focus on saved lives is quite common, making it 
especially important that lives be valued correctly.
E
ven if all moral objections are tabled, the 
current practice of discounting future 
human life cannot be justified even on a 
purely economic basis. Within the current 
CBA discounting regime, the discount 
rate for future lives should be radically reduced for 
two reasons, our two arguments. First, the inflation 
of health care costs, which are increasing far faster 
than the price of other goods and services, indicates 
that future generations will exhibit far greater will-
ingness to pay to avoid fatal risks than economists 
measure today. Second, modern industrialized soci-
eties tend to increase in wealth, meaning that even if 
health care does not increase as a portion of the U.S. 
gross domestic product, future generations of Ameri-
cans will be richer than Americans are today, mean-
ing they will have more money to spend avoiding risk 
— their lives will be worth more. Combined, these 
phenomena cause undervaluation of future human 
lives — leading to underestimation of the benefits 
of environmental and other regulation, resulting in 
needless deaths.
In recent years, rapid health care cost inflation has 
captured the attention of American politicians and 
scholars. CBA calculations, however, have not con-
sidered health inflation when calculating the value 
of future lives. Ignoring health inflation undervalues 
future lives no matter what discount rate is applied 
to future benefits. Accordingly, regardless of whether 
agencies should use 3 percent, 7 percent, or some 
other number — or even if they should use no dis-
count rate at all, that is, a rate of 0 percent — under-
estimating the future value of a life saved will cause a 
CBA calculation to lowball the present value of that 
future benefit.
From 1960 to 2006, health care costs tripled as 
a portion of the U.S. gross domestic product, rising 
from 5.2 percent to 16 percent of GDP. Since 1980, 
health inflation has outpaced general inflation on av-
erage by more than 3 percent annually. With Ameri-
cans devoting a greater percentage of their income 
to health care, it would appear that their willingness 
to pay to avoid death is rising. In other words, even 
in inflation-adjusted dollars, a future American will 
likely exhibit a willingness to pay more money to 
preserve his health (by, for example, avoiding a risk 
of death caused by exposure to workplace contami-
nants) than Americans do today. Assuming for the 
moment that health inflation will continue to out-
pace general inflation by 3 percent annually over the 
coming decade, then someone’s willingness to pay in 
2022 can be calculated as follows:
WTP2022 = WTP2012 • 1.03 
10 = WTP2012 • 1.34
Accounting for health inflation increases the value 
of a 2022 life by more than a third. Substituting a 
20-year time period increases the value of a 2032 life 
by 81 percent. The resulting future value could then 
be discounted to determine its present value. Note, 
however, that the closer the discount rate is to the ex-
cess health inflation rate, the closer the “real discount 
rate” for future lives comes to zero. For example, if 
the appropriate discount rate for future benefits is 3 
percent per year and health inflation also equals 3 
percent per year, then the present value of a human 
life, regardless of when in the future that life is saved, 
becomes equal to the value of a life saved today. Of 
course, one could quibble about the precise numbers 
selected, but the point is clear. As long as health care 
costs are expected to rise at a rate above general infla-
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tion — and an increasing share of GDP devoted to 
health care seems widely expected, if not universally 
applauded — then current CBA calculations under-
value future lives at least somewhat.
Current CBA discounting often further underval-
ues future lives because discounters regularly ignore 
rising per capita wealth (or, to be more precise, rising 
real — that is, inflation-adjusted — per capita income) 
in developed countries. Because the willingness to pay 
for safety is at least somewhat correlated with wealth, 
richer countries should use higher VSLs when assessing 
policies. Yet, when valuing the lives of persons saved in 
the future, many CBA calculators do not account for 
the growth of GDP in excess of inflation and popula-
tion growth. (Some agencies — such as EPA and the 
Department of Transportation — have recently begun 
accounting for rising real income, but most agencies 
have not done so.) Developed countries, such as the 
United States, see increases in real GDP (that is, GDP 
adjusted for inflation) nearly every year. Although part 
of increased GDP results from population growth, the 
United States has enjoyed rising real GDP per capita 
for decades, with an annual increase of about 1.8 per-
cent. Accordingly, the economic output of each Ameri-
can rises over time, even in inflation-adjusted dollars. 
Gains in output are divided among business profits, 
employee wages, and taxation, meaning that almost ev-
ery year, the average American sees a real increase in the 
total money coming  from profits (if, for example, he 
or she owns shares in for-profit companies), pay, and 
government outlays.
Any calculation of a VSL that incorporates will-
ingness to pay for safety or willingness to accept risk 
will tend to place greater value on persons with more 
disposable money. The reason is simple: Willingness 
to pay for goods increases when one has money in 
the first place (or at least has access to credit). Only 
someone with money can exhibit willingness to part 
with it. Conversely, the toleration of harms — such 
as dirty air or dangerous working conditions that a 
government agency might regulate — in exchange 
for money increases with poverty.
A simple example illustrates the principle. If we 
assume an annual increase in real per capita GDP of 
1.8 percent, then for every $1,000 produced by each 
person in the United States today, each American in 
10 years will produce $1,195. When the increased 
output returns to the economy in profits, wages, and 
government outlays, Americans will have that much 
more real wealth to spend. All things being equal, 
someone in 2022 would pay $1,195 to avoid a risk 
that someone would pay $1,000 to avoid today. The 
“wealth-adjusted” value of a 2022 benefit is therefore 
19.5 percent greater than the same benefit today, at 
least before discounting.
Next, one can apply discounting to these fig-
ures. If one ignores increased future wealth and then 
imagines a future harm of the kind Americans today 
would pay $1,000 to ameliorate, the present value of 
removing the future harm in 2022 is equal to
Future Benefit / ( 1 + Discount Rate ) Years 
which, with a discount rate of 7 percent and a period 
of 10 years equals
$1000 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $508
If the future benefit is valued at $1,195 instead of 
$1,000 — that is, if the benefit calculation accounts 
for the increased wealth of future Americans — then 
the value of removing the future harm in 2022 (using 
the same discount rate of 7 percent) is equal to 
$1,195 / ( 1 + 0.07 )10 = $607
The failure to use income-adjusted willingness to 
pay to avoid risk (and “willingness to accept” risk) 
figures when calculating the future benefits of health 
and safety regulations thereby leads to an undervalu-
ation of about 16 percent for benefits obtained in 
2022. For benefits accruing in 20 years, the under-
valuation is about 30 percent.
In addition, future Americans will likely devote 
at least part of their extra income directly to risk 
reduction. One cannot predict with certainty what 
wealthier Americans will do with their additional 
real dollars. Absent good evidence that no extra cash 
will cover safety costs, however, CBA calculators 
cannot justify their inattention to future purchasing 
power. Especially as the quality of safety technology 
improves — which seems nearly certain to occur, at 
least for those who can afford it — it would be bi-
zarre for Americans enjoying unprecedented wealth 
to skimp on their own safety.
When one combines the effects of health inflation 
and income-adjusted future willingness to pay, the un-
dervaluation of future benefits in current CBA prac-
tice becomes especially stark. Using the 3 percent fig-
ure from above for excess health inflation (that is, the 
rate at which health care costs increase above general 
inflation) and 1.8 percent for increased real GDP per 
capita, the future value of a benefit can be calculated as 
follows: The future value of a benefit equals the value 
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A n o t h e r  V i e w
Mend It or End It
Americans would assign to the same 
benefit available today, multiplied 
each year by both 1.03 and 1.018. 
The numbers combine for an annual 
increase of about 4.85 percent.
Unless CBA calculators can justi-
fy their failure to account for health 
inflation and increasing per capita 
real GDP, they should immediately 
begin increasing the estimated value 
of future health and safety benefits. 
While controversy would remain as 
to what discount rate is appropriate 
when determining the present value 
of such future benefits, a CBA that 
correctly values future benefits will 
find more accurate present values 
for any correctly chosen discount 
rate, and current practice arbitrarily 
reduces the values of future benefits.
The two simple corrections to 
CBA calculations proposed here 
would immensely increase the pro-
jected monetized benefits of regula-
tions expected to save lives in the 
future. By accounting for health in-
flation and rising real income, policy-
makers can more easily justify regu-
lations concerning workplace safety, 
clean air, clean water, and highway 
safety, to name just a few. In particu-
lar, the long-term benefits of amelio-
rating global warming would have 
substantially greater monetary value 
if properly calculated. Because many 
global warming regulations are the 
responsibility of EPA, the agency’s 
decision to incorporate rising real 
per capita income into its CBA is 
an important step in the right direc-
tion. Without silencing their ethical 
and moral critiques of discounting 
future human lives, those opposed 
to the practice should demand that 
if CBA calculations will incorporate 
such discounting, they must at least 
begin with a proper assessment of the 
future value to be discounted, a value 
one can accurately find only with a 
consideration of health care cost in-






tators such as Richard 
Revesz and Michael 
Livermore in arguing 
that, when it comes to regulatory 
cost-benefit analysis, we should 
mend it, not end it. In his view, fu-
ture regulatory benefits should be 
reduced to present value at a lower 
rate than current practice, given evi-
dence that health care costs rise at a 
higher rate than other goods and ser-
vices and that individuals exhibit a 
higher willingness to invest in health 
and safety as their incomes rise.
The latter income elasticity point 
is a significant one and represents 
a forward-looking version of an ar-
gument offered by Lisa 
Heinzerling and Frank 
Ackerman in their paper 
“If It Exists, It’s Getting 
Bigger: Revising the Val-
ue of a Statistical Life.” 
At the time they 
were writing, the stan-
dard VSL measure used 
by federal agencies not 
only failed to adjust for greater 
potential spending power in the 
future, it also failed to account for 
income increases we had already 
experienced. Many key VSL stud-
ies rely on market evidence that is 
over two decades old. If we serious-
ly believe that such studies reveal 
people’s preferences for investing in 
risk reduction, then we should be 
serious about the methodology and 
adjust it for inflation and income 
elasticity, as EPA has begun doing 
under the current administration. 
The next step for federal agen-
cies should be to follow Professor 
Trachtenberg’s recommendation 
and adjust for anticipated wage 
growth into the future as well.
The former recommendation 
gives more pause, as it could be 
seen as an opportunistic use of 
CBA’s weaknesses, rather than a 
strengthening of the methodology. 
Professor Trachtenberg infers that 
health care inflation represents ris-
ing consumer demand, rather than 
rent-taking, administrative inef-
ficiency, moral hazard, and other 
market failures that contribute to 
the spectacular rise in U.S. health 
care expenditures. CBA practitio-
ners do often estimate the value 
of regulatory benefits by looking 
to actual market behavior. But the 
health care market seems like an es-
pecially hazardous place to deploy 
that approach. After all, Professor 
Trachtenberg’s health inflation for-
mula implies that at some point in 
the future America’s health care ex-
penditures will approach one hun-
dred percent of GDP.
Obviously, something 
is wrong with the way 
we are divining people’s 
preferences. Strategically, 
Professor Trachtenberg’s 
example serves to jus-
tify reducing the amount 
by which future health 
benefits are discounted. 
Analytically, the example serves to 
reveal how fragile the CBA edifice 
really is. 
Advocates can — and should 
— continue to press for preferred 
policy results using the dominant 
language of CBA. In that sense, we 
applaud Professor Trachtenberg’s ef-
forts to make CBA practice more 
consistent with its own intellectual 
premises. But whatever incremental 
gain is attained will simultaneously 
underscore the chief problem of reli-
ance on CBA: each effort to tweak 
the process, to offer a more balanced 
analysis, shows how manipulable 
the methodology remains.
Doug Kysar is Deputy Dean and Joseph 
M. Field ’55 Professor at Yale Law School. 
This view was co -authored by Josh 
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